This paper examines whether variations in strong boards explain the differences between risktaking in Islamic and conventional banks. From an analysis of a pooled sample of Islamic and conventional banks, we find that strong boards in general serve their shareholders through engaging in higher risk-taking activities across both types of banks. In Islamic banks, however, the Shari'ah supervisory board (SSB) is found to mitigate risk-taking when integrated with a strong board, as religiosity restrains risk-taking. We recommend that Islamic bank regulators improve the SSB's monitoring abilities, and thus facilitate its interaction with the board of directors.
Introduction
Boards are key corporate governance instruments and perform a significant role in trying to align the interests of the managers with those of the owners. Whereas a one-tier board structure is standard in common law countries, many civil-law countries (such as Germany, France, and the Nordic countries) have a tradition of two-tier systems with also a supervisory board. Supervisory boards are also common e.g. in China, and in the Islamic banking system, where the Shari'ah supervisory board can take supervisory or advisory roles. While there can be advantages of a twotier system e.g. in post-merger governance, and through boardroom diversity, two-tier systems may also be adopted for political rather than economic reasons, or to provide a "graceful exit" for entrenched managers (Millet-Reyes and Zhao, 2010) . Studies analyzing performance effects of supervisory boards have typically found no effect (e.g. Rose, 2005 , for Danish semi-two-tier boards), or some weak positive or negative effects (Chao and Rui, 2009, for China, and MilletReyes and Zhao, 2010, for France) . Such studies has typically been conducted for non-financial firms. For banks, Mollah and Zaman (2015) found positive performance effects of the Shari'ah supervisory board. Very few studies look on the effect on firm risk, even though the supervisory role of the supervisory board might indicate that their role in the two-tier system is largely about overseeing risk taking. The Shari'ah supervisory board is an interesting type of supervisory board, which risk reducing effects may be especially significant, as religiosity and the specific principles derived from religion that they overlook should restrain risk-taking. Mollah et al. (2016) is one exception who also looked at the effect on default risk (the Z-score) in a study of traditional and Islamic banks, and found that although the Islamic banks have a lower insolvency risk than traditional banks, the conditional effect of strong corporate governance is significantly more favorable for risk taking in Islamic banks. However, this study did not dig deeper into specific individual features in Islamic bank governance.
We contribute to the prior research on the links between a specific form of supervisory board, that in the one in the Islamic banking system, and bank risk by looking at many different bank risk proxies (insolvency, funding and credit risks). We also contribute by analyzing explicitly the role of board strength (in line with Pathan, 2009 ) in the governance relationship. By employing a two-step GMM estimation on a matched pair sample of 172 Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks in 25 countries between 2005 and 2011, we find that the relationship between strong boards and higher risk-taking is basically similar (a positive one) for both types of banks. However, when strong boards interact with the Shari'ah supervisory board, Islamic banks are more risk averse than traditional banks. Andres et al. (2008) and Pathan (2009) stress that boards have become more active in monitoring management behavior due to the complexity of banking operations. The bank risk-taking literature identifies charter value, capital regulation, ownership structure, and market discipline as controlling mechanisms for bank risks, but studies on bank risk-taking and board governance are scarce 1 . The Islamic bank (IB) literature broadly covers stability, risk management and global crisis, capital regulation and risk aversion, and performance and efficiency 2 , but its board governance literature is also sparse. A few exceptions (like Abu-Tapanjeh 2009 , Chowdhury and Hoque 2006 , and Lewis 2005 offer theoretical contributions about the uniqueness of IBs due to Shari'ah governance.
Safieddine (2009) also stresses that IB governance structure is unique because it must also ensure an adherence to Shari'ah ethics and morality. Since Islamic banking imposes certain religious principles on the products offered, such as the absence of interest and excessive uncertainty (Abedifar et al., 2013) , principles that have lead to the development of different risk-sharing mechanisms such as profit-loss sharing, it also introduces additional complexity into such a banking system. A more complex system may need a different form of governance, and e.g. benefit more from stronger boards, and supervisory boards. The research question of whether Islamic banks' risk taking is lower than that in traditional banks due to strong boards or the Shari'as supervisory board, is therefore of interest.
The primary concept of Islamic banking has emerged from religious beliefs. The potential for differences between Islamic and conventional banks is supported by the religious and economic behavior literature of Smith (1776) , Weber (1905) , Miller and Hoffmann (1995) and Hilary and Hui (2009) . We argue that this same religious view can be applied to IBs, and that a bank board comprised of Muslims is likely to be more risk averse than one comprised of a more diverse range of ethnic and religious backgrounds. A devoted Muslim would more than fulfill the religiosity aspects of these earlier Christian-related studies in respect to attending religious services, frequency of prayer, and the observing specific behavior. Moreover, Vroom (1966) argues that staff seek employment at organizations that hold similar values. Thus, an IB would seemingly attract more devoted Muslim staff as well as customers than conventional banks (Halek and Eisehauer, 2001 ).
This application of Islamic principles, as discussed later, should be further enhanced by the Shari'ah supervisory board (SSB), which is considered to the cornerstone of IB governance. Our suggestion is that, Shari'ah supervisory board plays a critical role as it has not only evolved from the religiosity principle, but it also underpins a stronger governance system in IBs. This lack of IB governance attention prompts our second research question: What specific factors in Shariah supervisor board structures explain potential differences in risk-taking among IBs? Besides looking at supervisory 1 These bank governance and risk-taking studies are Akhigbe and Martin (2008) and Pathan (2009) . 2 The studies on Islamic banking include Abedifar et al. (2013) , Ahmed (2009 ), Ariss (2010 , Beck et al. (2013) , Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) , Cihak and Hesse (2010) , Hassan and Dicle (2012) , Hasan and Dridi (2010) , Kayed (2009), Johnes et al. (2014) , Misman and Bhatti (2012) , Muljawan et al. (2004) , Olson and Zoubi (2008) , Shaikh and Jalbani (2009), and Yudistira (2004) .
boards, we will also look at the regular bank board in the two-tier system, and two of its characteristics according to Pathan's (2009) definition of strong boards, that is board size and independence. This paper offers several contributions to the bank governance literature. In regards to IB risktaking and governance, to our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the relation between a strong (regular) board, which is embedded by multi-layer governance system, and the risk-taking in IBs. Our findings provide empirical support for the theoretical views of Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Chowdhury and Hoque, 2006; and Lewis, 2005 as well as new evidence on strong board, Shari'ah supervisory board (SSB), and risk-taking in IBs. Mollah and Zaman (2015) , for example, emphasizes difference in firm performance (but not risks) due to Shari'ah supervision/ advisory efforts whereas Mollah et al. (2016) investigate the commonalities and differences between Islamic and conventional bank governance systems but only in broad terms. Safieddin (2009) concentrated on agency theory as related to the cash flow and control rights of investors. Our paper instead focuses on the multi-layer governance system in IBs, and exploits its difference vs. conventional banks (CBs), in order to test effects on multiple measures for bank risks. 3 Our unique database, including hand collected items from annual reports, facilitates large sample tests using a rich set of controls.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the theory and hypotheses development; section 3 presents the data and methodology of the study. Section 4 reports our empirical results. Our concluding remarks are included in section 5.
Theory and Hypotheses Development
Islamic banking developed on the basis of Shari'ah principles. These prohibit the payment or receipt of Riba (interest) (Obaidullah, 2005 and Cihak and Hesse, 2010) or the financing of nonhalal activities (i.e. alcoholic beverages, pork, non-Islamic media (pornography), and gambling.
Shari'ah also requires that contracts be free of excessive uncertainty "Gharar" (Obaidullah, 2005) , and hence restricts the use of financial derivatives and similar contracts (including some insurance policies). Islamic banking evolved from the Shari'ah rules on transactions 'Figh al-Muamalat' (Abedifar et al. 2013) , which can be categorized as debt-based, lease-based, and profit and loss sharing (PLS) finance 4 . These present an alternative to the conventional concept of interest as a 'return on capital' by relying on more sales-type products and services based on profit-loss sharing, mark-up financing, and leasing, along with relationship-type banking (Abedifar et al. 2013 ).
Our discussion here centers on both the more traditional theoretical aspects of bank corporate governance to include agency theory in respect to risk-taking, and the impact of religion on these risk behavior issues.
Agency Theory, Corporate Governance and Risk-taking
The banking literature has emphasized the agency problems related to shareholder incentives.
Limited liability allows shareholders to retain all the upside gains, while sharing their losses with bondholders. Hence, bank shareholders have an incentive to expropriate wealth from bondholders by increasing risk. Shareholders effectively hold a call option on the firm's value, with an exercise price equal to the total amount of debt outstanding. Shareholders can enhance this underlying call option's value by increasing the bank's risk (Galai and Masulis, 1976) . Due to information asymmetry, the dispersed and unsophisticated bank debt holders cannot prevent more risk-taking by initiating complete debt contracts on an ex-ante basis (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994) . Bank shareholders also have incentives for risk-taking due to the moral hazard problems associated with deposit insurance (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and John et al., 1991) .
There is some conflicting literature on board structure and firm performance for both banks and corporations. On one hand, Pathan and Faff (2013) , and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) , report that both board size and independence are negatively related to performance. They stress that board size negatively affects performance due to coordination costs and free-riding problems, and the fact that individual directors' incentives to acquire information and monitor managers are lower in larger boards. On the other hand, Sierra et al. (2006) suggest that strong boards improve CBs' performance. Andres and Vallelado (2008) report a positive effect of both board size and independent directors on bank performance. Cornett et al. (2009) note that higher stock returns and operating performance are associated with boards with a higher proportion of outside directors. However, Francis et al. (2012) find that better governed firms performed better during the financial crisis. Adams and Mehran (2012) also show a positive relationship between board size and performance, but they fail to identify any relationship between performance and independent 4 With debt-based financing, the financier purchases, or has the underlying assets constructed, and then sells them to the client. The sale would be on a deferred-payment basis with one or several installments. With lease-based financing, the financier purchases, or has the underlying assets constructed, and then rents it to the client. At the end of the rental period (or proportionate to the rentals), ownership would be transferred wholly or partially to the client. With PLS financing: the financier is a limited or joint venture partner of the client and any realized profit or loss would be shared according to pre-agreed proportions (Khan and Ahmed, 2001 ). The first two Islamic finance methods are collectively known as Non-Profit and Loss Sharing "Non-PLS".
directors. In contrast, Wintoki et al. (2012) observe no significant relationship between either board size or board independence and firm performance.
Recent governance scandals during the global crisis, however, have placed the spotlight on independent directors in bank governance (Cornett et al. 2009 ). As independent board members consider their reputation to be a valuable asset (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) , they are viewed externally as valuable monitors. This will not only increase the value of their human capital, but also uphold their reputation (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; and Gilson, 1990) . Nevertheless, the empirical research on board structure and risk-taking is limited. By defining a strong board as a smaller board with higher independence, Pathan (2009) finds that a strong board better serves their shareholders by inducing higher risk-taking activities.
Religiosity and Risk-taking
The existing literature shows a positive relationship between religiosity and an individual's risk aversion. Miller and Hoffmann (1995) consider religious behavior as risk averse and non-religious behavior as risk-taking and find that those that scoring highly on risk aversion are more religious. Miller (2000) empirically supports the view that being religious and attending religious services are positively correlated with a risk averse preference. also finds that risk averse individuals attend church more often than risk-takers. Diaz (2000) similarly notes that attenders of religious activities gamble less frequently and for lesser amounts than less regular attendees. At an organizational level, studies like Hilary and Hui (2009) also show that firms located in counties with higher levels of religiosity are less exposed to risk. Dyreng, Mayew and Williams (2012) Given the basic Islamic Shari'ah principles, risk-taking behavior in IBs may also differ in various risk categories. Abedifar et al. (2013) reveal that IBs face greater credit risk due to the complexity of Islamic loan contracts, limited default penalties, and moral hazard incentives caused by PLS contracts. In contrast, the greater discipline associated with their depositors' risk aversion and borrowers' religious beliefs induce loyalty, and discourage default. It thus helps reduce credit risk for IBs. IBs, however, may face insolvency risk if forced to mirror the pricing behavior of their conventional bank competitors. Even though charging an interest rate is forbidden, IBs may still be sensitive to interest rate changes. Errico and Farahbakhsh (1998) argue that IBs should place a greater emphasis on operational risk due to the special risks associated with PLS. In certain cases, IBs cannot mitigate credit risk by demanding collateral from clients due to their partnership relationship 5 . Khan and Ahmad (2001) claim that the IB profit or loss investment account holders may introduce withdrawal risk as well as their own unique risk characteristics due to the various Shari'ah constraints.
IBs also anticipate different funding risk due to the nature of their deposits. These are either in current accounts that bear no interest but must be repaid on demand, or investment (or savings) accounts that generate a return based on profits. These profit rates may be adjusted according to the realized profit (or loss), which would then be shared between the IB and its investment account holders (Iqbal, Ausaf, and Khan, 1998) . This PLS arrangement can (in theory at least) provide procyclical protection in the event of adverse conditions-profit rates decline in bad times and increase in good times. Nevertheless, Obaidullah (2005) argues that (deposit) withdrawal risk may even persuade IBs to deviate from traditional Shari'ah financing principles. This occurs if banks pay competitive market returns to investment account holders, regardless of the bank's actual underlying performance. However, this payoff is contingent on both the bank's performance as well as the religiosity of its depositors. The latter may result in an ambiguous outcome as religious depositors may be more loyal and prepared to take lower returns, and not withdraw (or at least stall) their deposits even when the bank's performance deteriorates.
IB corporate governance also differs from the CBs' 'single layer' governance 6 system due to its Shari'ah governance approach (Mollah and Zaman, 2015) . As discussed earlier, Islamic banking originates from religiosity principle. Thus, we agree with existing studies (e.g. Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Chowdhury and Hoque, 2006; Lewis, 2005) that the first layer the governance system in IBs should be belief in God and/or the principles of Islam. However, Mollah and Zaman (2015) argue that SSB is the corner stone of Islamic banking governance system. Hence, we propose that the second layer in Islamic banking governance system is the Shari'ah supervisory board. SSB is considered as the 'Supra Authority' in Islamic banking (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006) . It has an overall 5 In practice, Islamic bankers will often mitigate this problem by providing their client with a package of funding products. With a property development, for example, the land might be subject to an ijarah (sale and lease back) funding and the development itself through a PLS arrangement. 6 Conventional banks (CBs) in our sample use a 'single-layer' governance system with a board of directors (BoD) and normal executive and operational committees. While some European countries like Germany and Austria have two-tier board structures, the European supervisory board oversees what is effectively a board of directors comprised of the firm's internal managers. In contrast, the Islamic Shari'ah Supervisory Board overseas both the directors and the operation of the bank itself. monitoring authority over the IB's board of directors (BoD) and seeks to ensure that IBs are not exposed to toxic securities like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (Ahmed, 2009) or derivative products like credit default swaps (CDS). Finally, the third layer of the Islamic banking governance system is the BoD. We argue that this multi-layer governance system safeguards IBs from excessive risk-taking decisively, not only due to its religiosity but also its Shari'ah monitoring.
Two different arguments evolve around Islamic banking and risk-taking. On one hand, there is the religiosity principle 7 and the role of Shari'ah supervision (Mollah and Zaman, 2015) . Due to these, some may consider it a stylized fact that IBs are less risky. On the other hand, the shareholder incentives hypothesis based on agency theory may cause banks with strong boards to be involved in higher risk-taking activities, and empirical findings for conventional banks support this idea.
Islamic banks may due to their special governance system score high in the "strong board" measure. Thus it is an interesting question to study to what extent the risk-taking in IB differs from their conventional counterparts when board strength according to Pathan (2009) is taken into account. We expect that also for IBs, board strength as such is positively related to risk taking. This view may be warranted especially if the division of labor is considered as such that it is the supervisory board that poses limits for risk taking, and the board acts within these limits to maximize profits. Our even more interesting research question is whether that relation is significantly different in strength for IBs as compared to CBs due to the existence of the SSB. Our hypotheses are as follows:
H1: Islamic banks are less risky as compared to traditional banks.
H2: In both CBs and IBs, stronger boards take more risks.

H3: There are differences in how board strength influence risk taking between CBs and IBs.
We will test for the effects of board strength both by looking at its components, that is board size and independence, as well as by using a composite variable for it. The rejection of H1 and especially of H3 indicates that a difference in risk-taking exists and may be due to the structure of Shari'ah supervision in IBs. If the result that stronger boards take more risks in banking, as the findings from traditional banking literature such as Pathan (2009) suggest, then (since the smallness of the board is one variable contributing to board strength), larger boards might be assumed to be more risk averse. If this finding can be generalized also for the SSBs, a larger SBB may be related to less risk taking. We propose the following hypothesis:
H4: The Shari'ah supervisory board structure mitigates the effects that a strong regular board has on risk taking.
We will test this hypothesis both using a level variable, and when interacted with a variable for board strength. In that latter case, we explicitly test whether the effect of a strong board on risk is reduced, when the regular board is supervised by a risk-averse SSB. Table 1 , Malaysia and Pakistan represent 26% 10 of our sample. Other well-represented countries include: Bahrain (9%), Sudan (8%), United Arab Emirates (8%), Bangladesh (6%), Kuwait (6%), 8 Beck et al. (2013) explained that this process helps control for any unobserved time-variant effect by introducing country-year dummies. 9 We matched both bank types based on the 2005 asset size and number of branches if the data available for both bank-types in 2005. Otherwise, we matched the banks at the first data point where data for both bank-types is available. After the matching, our sample had 86 pairs of banks. For clarity, we offer two matching examples respectively from Bahamas and Brunei. In the former, our 2 banks from Bahamas namely Dar Al-Maal (IB) and Safra Bank (CB) both had financial data from 2005. The total asset and number of branches in 2005 for the IB (Dar Al-Maal) were USD2, 425M and 17 and its matched CB pair (Safra Bank) in 2005 has total asset of USD2, 625M and 21 branches. For Brunei, our 2 banks, Perbadanan Tabung (IB) and Baiduri Bank (CB) both had financial data from 2007. The total asset and number of branches in 2007 for the IB (Perbadanan Tabung) were USD246M and 19 and its matched CB pair (Baiduri Bank) has total asset of USD252M and 13 branches. 10 Malaysia and Pakistan with 26% of our sample could raise concerns about unbalanced sampling, but others have used similar sample distributions. Abedifar et al. (2013) , for example, had 24 countries with Malaysia and Indonesia comprising 25% of their sample, and four countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Lebanon, and Turkey) with 43%. Beck et al. (2013) had 22 countries with Malaysia and UK providing 28% of the sample banks, and four countries (Malaysia, UK, Pakistan and Indonesia) with 43%. Similarly, Mollah and Zaman (2015) used 25 countries with Malaysia and Indonesia accounting for 26% and four countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Bahrain and UAE) with 43% . To ensure that these two countries did not drive our results, our tests were then re-run excluding them. Though not reported here, our findings remained robust.
and Turkey (5%).
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Measures for the Dependent Variables
We follow prior literature in our measures for risk taking in banks. We utilize Log_Z (log of Zscore) as the proxy for insolvency risk (see Pathan, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Cihak and Hesse, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Beck et al. 2013; Abedifar et al. 2013; and Fu et al. 2014) , tangible equity to total assets ratio (TANEQU) as a proxy of funding risk (Karels and Prakash, 1987) , and the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL) as the proxy of credit risk (e.g. John et al., 1991; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Beck et al. 2013; and Abedifar et al. 2013) 11 .
Measures for Explanatory Variables
Our board structure variables for the regular bank board in the two-tier system are the log of board size (LnBoard) and board independence (Indep -the ratio of independent directors to total board members). Following Pathan (2009), a 'Strong Board' consists of small board size (smaller than median board size) and higher independence (greater than median board independence). For the supervisory board, we use lnSSB (log of SSB size) as the Shari'ah monitoring variable.
The firm level control variables include the Big four audit firm (Big4), risk disclosure index (RDI), capitalization (EQTA), and size (Log_TA). We also control CEO power by employing two CEO related variables: CEO-chair duality (CEO_Chair) and internally recruited CEO (CEO_Internal).
Finally, we use dummy for listing control since approximately half the sample banks (both Islamic and conventional) are listed.
The regulatory restriction (Restrict), and deposit insurance (Dinsur) are the country regulation proxies. The country level control variables include religion (Religion) and GDP (Log_GDP). A full description of all their variables including references to previous studies is included in Table 2 .
Empirical Model
We test our hypotheses by estimating a dynamic panel data model on different risk-taking behavior of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks, due to their variation in board characteristics in a difference-in-difference specification by considering IBs as the treatment and CBs as the control sample. Our estimations are conducted in two steps. 11 Our 86:86 sample (IBs vs. CBs) include both listed and unlisted banks. Approximately 50 percent of our matched sample (IBs vs. CBs) is unlisted, which limits our use of market based proxies for the analysis. We assign our Islamic dummy as 1 for the 86 Islamic banks (listed and unlisted) and 0 for the 86 conventional banks (listed and unlisted). Our approach to include both listed and unlisted banks in the sample is similar to other comparative banking (Islamic vs. conventional) studies (e.g. Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al. 2013; and Mollah and Zaman, 2015) . A listing dummy, as explained in 3.3, is used to control for this in our models.
In step one, we estimate the following baseline equation, Eq. (1) where, Riski,t are the risk-taking proxies (e.g. Log_Z, TANEQU and NPL), Islamic is the IB dummy, LnBoard is the log of board size, Indep is the ratio of independent directors to board size, bank characteri,t are the bank-level variables and country control it are the country level variables, * is the country-year-fixed effects, and is the white-noise error term. 2 helps to determine average difference between Islamic and CBs; our various will allow us to gauge the differences between Islamic and CBs due to board characteristics. A detailed description of the variables is included in Table 2 .
In where, Strong Boardi,t is the board of director variable. The construction process of strong board is described above. The in Eq. (2b) allows us to gauge the influence of the Shari'ah supervisory board in risk-taking behaviour by IBs in the case of a strong board.
Our two equations (Eq.1-2) in their two permutations (a and b) suffer from the potential endogeneity of several right-hand side variables. The system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is suited to address these endogeneity issues by means of appropriate instruments. This is achieved by combining the moment conditions from the first-differenced and the levels equations. The Blundell and Bond (1998) system estimator has two advantages over other dynamic panel data methods, most notably, the difference-in-difference estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . First, as long as the instruments are valid, the GMM estimator exhibits higher levels of both consistency and efficiency. Second, unlike the difference estimator, the system GMM estimator permits the use of time-invariant (or highly persistent) variables in our specifications.
This will be particularly useful when estimating the impact of the governance characteristics, which show little variation over time, on the bank risk-taking. The instruments are chosen to comply with the identification of the GMM estimation method. We achieve this by exploiting the first lag difference of bank characteristics as instruments in the level equation, and second of bank characteristics as instruments in the difference equation. The first lag difference eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias. This approach means that we treat all bank characteristics as endogenous covariates, while the country and macro controls are strictly exogenous. We introduce country-year dummies ( * ) in the estimation method to control for any unobserved time-variant effect 12 in the sample, as our sample is unbalanced towards countries like Malaysia and Pakistan, and Islam is the major religion in 94% 13 of the sample countries.
The validity of our approach rests on two assumptions, which we test for each of our estimations.
First, for the instruments to be valid, they need to be uncorrelated with the error term. We use the Hansen J-statistic of over-identifying restrictions to test this assumption where statistically insignificant values confirm the validity of the instruments. Second, the system GMM estimator requires stationarity in the post-instrumentation error terms. This implies the absence of secondorder serial correlation in the first difference residual. We employ the m2 statistic developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test for the lack of second-order serial correlation in the first difference residual. An insignificant m2 statistic indicates that the model is correctly specified.
Description of the Data
The descriptive statistics for our key variables are presented in the repressors are not high, which suggests that the models are free from multicollinearity.
However, the correlation coefficient between TANEQU and EQTA stands at 0.99. As this 13 As with our sample, prior studies (e.g. Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al. 2013; and Mollah and Zaman, 2015) reported that 95% of their sample countries were Muslim countries. Thus, our approach is similar to other comparative banking analysis. 14 An external auditor reports whether their client's financial statement fairly represents their actual position. Its role within the firm, however, is much more extensive. To render an opinion, the auditor must gain an understanding of the firm and its operations. By interacting with the internal audit staff, external auditors may influence them to improve their internal practices and external reporting. The positive correlation between the risk disclosure index and a Big Four audit firm is hardly surprising.
indicates a collinearity problem between these two variables, EQTA is dropped from the funding risk (TANEQU) models.
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Empirical Results
Risk-taking in IBs and Board Characteristics
We test H1 to H3 by estimating our models (Eq. 1a and Eq. 1b), i.e. by both looking at the characteristics of the regular board, as well as those characteristics combined into a single Strong Board measure. Table 4 reports the results for our first model on for the three risk-taking proxies in columns 1 to 3. As the lag value of risk-taking proxies is positive (significant), this indicates the importance of controlling for the dynamic of bank risk-taking in our empirical analysis. However, the Hansen J test of over identification restrictions and the m2 test of second-order autocorrelation are not significant. This supports the validity of our selected instruments and the GMM estimator.
We find that one key variable of interest, the IB dummy (Islamic), is positively (significantly) related to insolvency risk (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), but negatively related to credit risk (NPL). This suggests that IBs are more risk averse in general, and supports our H1. Likewise, the Muslim religion appears a significant instrument among the country variables. We find that Islam as a major religion (Religion) is positively (significantly) related to insolvency (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU) and negatively (significantly) related to credit risk (NPL). These results support our basic religiosity principle that the Islamic religion restrains risk-taking.
For board size (LnBoard), our initial results in Table 4 are contrary to Pathan (2009) and Cheng (1998) , who both found that small boards are associated with more taking. We find that LnBoard in table 4 has a significant negative relation to the distance to default, and as well as the tangible equity to assets ratio, and is positively (significantly) related to non-performing loans. This would indicate that bigger boards induce higher risk-taking, which goes against our H2. When interacted with the Islamic dummy, the interactions are significant and in line with even more risk-taking in Islamic banks. The latter supports our H3 about differences in effects between CBs and IBs.
Our board independence (Indep) variable in Table 4 has as significant negative relation to insolvency and funding risks, but is significantly positively related to credit risk. Higher independence would thus seem to induce higher risk-taking in line with H2. This is also in line with what Pathan (2009) hypothetized (but did not find, for the independence variable). Our findings support the shareholder incentives view that the independent directors serve the shareholders' best interests (Galai and Masulis, 1976) . Conversely, the results for independent director reject the concept that independent directors are concerned about their reputations due to excessive risktaking fallibility (Alchian and Demstez, 1972 ) . The interaction term between IB dummy (Islamic) and board independence (Islamic*Indep) is negatively related to insolvency risk and funding risk proxies, but positively (significantly) related to credit risk proxy. This indicates that higher independence moreover induces more risk-taking in IBs, i.e. supports our H3.
Among the firm level control variables 15 , profitability (ROIAA) is positively (significantly) related to insolvency risk (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), and negatively related to credit risk (NPL). This suggests that higher operating profitability mitigates risk-taking. Likewise, the equity to total asset ratio (EQTA) is positively (significant) related to insolvency risk (Log_Z) and negatively related to credit risk (NPL). This indicates that higher capitalization mitigates risk-taking.
Nevertheless, CEO characteristics and listing play no significant role in explaining risk-taking activities due to inconsistencies in sign and significance.
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We then extend our analysis of risk-taking behavior differences due to the variation in board characteristics in line with our equation Eq. (1b). We replace board size (LnBoard) and independence (Indep) with 'Strong Board' in Eq. (1a). As shown in Table 5 , the lag values of risktaking proxies are positive (significant) for all models as before. This shows the importance of controlling for the dynamic of bank risk-taking in our empirical analysis. However, the Hansen J test of over identification restrictions and the m2 test of second-order autocorrelation are not significant and so supports the validity of the selected instruments and the GMM estimator.
Our IB dummy (Islamic) is positively (significantly) related to insolvency (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), but negatively related to credit risk (NPL). This is in line with the results in Table 4 and indicates that IBs are more risk averse in general, as compared to CBs, i.e. in line with H1.
When the effects of board size and independence are combined into one measure in Table 5 , we now find that the net effect is that strong boards (smaller and more independent) are associated with higher risk taking in terms of the distance to default and tangible equity variables, but less risk taking for the NPL variable. These results again lend some support for H2.
Our main variable of interest in this equation, the Islamic*Strong Board, is negatively (significantly) related to both insolvency risk and funding risk, but positively (significant) related to credit risk.
This indicates that the strong board induces higher risk-taking in IBs, i.e. there are significant differences between CBs and IBs in line with H3. These findings also support the shareholder incentives view of Galai and Masulis, (1976) , and are in line the prior view (e.g. Pathan, 2009 ; for banking firms and Cheng, 2008; for corporate firms) that a strong board induces higher risk-taking.
Muslim religion is positively (significant) related to insolvency (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), and negatively (significant) related to credit risk (NPL). These results again support our religiosity principle, that the Muslim religion restrains risk-taking, and hence, our interpretations are the same as the baseline model reported in Table 4 . We also find that profitability (ROIAA) is positively (significant) related to insolvency risk (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), and negatively related to credit risk (NPL). This indicates that higher operating profitability mitigates risk-taking by IBs. Likewise, the equity cushion (EQTA) is positively (significant) related to insolvency risk (Log_Z) and negatively related to credit risk (NPL),
indicating that equity capitalization mitigates risk-taking. Our CEO characteristics and listed banks did not influence risk-taking (neither of the coefficients are consistent nor significant).
In summary, the results so far support first of all our H1 about a significantly lower risk in general in IBs, and a significant influence from religion on risk. The results of both equations 1a and 1b broadly support H2 and H3, i.e. that there is a relation between the risk-taking of Islamic and CBs and their strong board structures, and that there are significant differences in how board strength associates with risk taking between these bank groups. Interestingly, our results so far indicate that even if Islamic banks in general take significantly less risks, regular board strength relates to stronger risk-taking behavior in IBs as compared to CBs.
Insert Table 5 about to be here
Board Characteristics, Shari'ah Supervision and Risk-taking in IBs
Our H4 testing examines the impact of the Shari'ah supervisory board on IB risk-taking, by employing Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b). The results from Eq. (2a) are reported in Table 6 . We present three models for our three risk-taking proxies in columns 1 to 3. The lag value of risk-taking proxies is positive (significant) and confirms the need to control for the dynamic of bank risk-taking in our empirical analysis. The Hansen J test of over identification restrictions and the m2 test of secondorder autocorrelation, however, are not significant and so supports the validity of the selected instruments and the GMM estimator.
The coefficient for board size (LnBoard) is negatively (significantly) related to both insolvency risk and funding risk, and positively (significant) related to credit risk. This would indicate that larger boards induce higher IB risk-taking, in line with the results in Table 4 . Likewise, board independence (Indep) is also negatively related to insolvency risk and funding risk, and positively (significant) related to credit risk. As before, this illustrates that higher independence induces IB risk-taking.
The LnSSB coefficient is found to be negatively related to insolvency risk (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), and positively related to credit risk (NPL). Thus, the larger the SSB size, the more IB risk-taking happens. This may reflect a similar outcome often found in the corporate literature where larger boards are less effective as a controlling mechanism.
As before, the Muslim religion is a significant instrument among the country variables as a major religion (Religion) and is positively (significant) related to insolvency (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), and negatively (significant) related to credit risk (NPL). These results are consistent with our religiosity principle that Islamic religion restrains risk-taking activities.
Like the baseline estimation, profitability (ROIAA) is positively (significant) related to insolvency risk (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), and negatively related to credit risk (NPL). It suggests that higher operating profitability mitigates risk-taking by IBs. The equity cushion (EQTA) is also positively (significant) related to insolvency risk (Log_Z) and negatively related to credit risk (NPL).
This indicates that equity capitalization mitigates risk-taking. The CEO variable coefficients for CEO-Chair and CEO-Internal show negative relationships with insolvency risk (Log_Z), funding risk (TANEQU) and credit risk (NPL), but they are insignificant, except for CEO-Chair with insolvency risk and CEO-Internal with funding risk, and so are inconclusive. Finally, a stock exchange listing does not influence IB risk-taking behaviour (neither of the coefficients are consistent nor significant).
Insert Table 6 about to be here Our test of Eq (2b) extends our analysis for further board characteristics and SSB. Here we replace the board size (LnBoard) and independence (Indep) variables of Eq. (2) with strong board (smaller board and higher independence), and also include interaction terms. As shown in Table 7 , the lag value of risk-taking proxies is positive (significant). This indicates the importance of controlling for the dynamic of bank risk-taking in our empirical analysis. The Hansen J test of over identification restrictions and the m2 test of second-order autocorrelation, however, are not significant, and supports the validity of the selected instruments and the GMM estimator.
The coefficient for strong board is negatively (significant) related to both insolvency risk and funding risk, but is positively (significant) related to credit risk. This indicates that strong boards induce high risk-taking in IBs. Again, these findings support the shareholder incentives hypothesis (Galai and Masulis, 1976) , and confirm the prior views (e.g. Pathan, 2009 ; for banking firms and Cheng, 2008; for corporate firms) that a strong board induces higher risk-taking. However, we find that the LnSSB coefficient is negatively related to insolvency risk (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), but positively related to credit risk (NPL). This indicates that the larger the SSB size, the more the risk-taking by IBs. This may reflect a similar outcome often found in the corporate literature, where larger boards are less effective in controlling the mechanism. Thus, our interpretation is that the stronger Shari'ah supervisory board restrains IB risk-taking. The interaction between the strong board and SSB (Strong Board*LnSSB) shows the interaction term positively related to both insolvency risk (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU) but negatively related to credit risk (NPL). This indicates that the interaction between these two boards mitigates IB risk-taking and hence supports H4.
As in equation 2a, Islam as a major religion (Religion) is positively (significant) related to insolvency (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), but negatively (significant) related to credit risk (NPL).
These results are consistent with our basic theoretical principle that religiosity restrains risk-taking activities and our earlier main findings (see Tables 4-6 ). The CEO-Chair duality coefficients are negative for all risk proxies, but only the insolvency risk (Log_Z) coefficient is significant. Similarly, as CEO_Internal coefficients are negatively related to all risk-taking proxies, the funding risk coefficient is highly significant. However, from other firm level variables, equity cushion (EQTA)
is positively related to insolvency risk but negatively related to credit risk and so equity appears to mitigate IB risk-taking. Similarly, as profitability (ROIAA) is positively (significant) related to insolvency risk (Log_Z) and funding risk (TANEQU), and negatively related to credit risk (NPL), higher operating profitability mitigates risk-taking by IBs. Finally, a stock exchange listing did not influence IB risk-taking. The results of both equations 2a and 2b therefore support H4, that the Shari'ah supervisory board structure mitigates the effects which as strong regular board has on risk taking.
Insert Table 7 about here
Discussion:
Religiosity theory is a key aspect of our study. Our findings that both the Muslim religion and IB dummy reduces risk-taking provides support for the religiosity theory in IBs. They indicate that religiosity not only restraints IBs from excessive risk-taking, but also plays a significant role within the Islamic banking system. This study supports the Hilary and Hui (2009) and Dyreng, Mayew, and Williams (2012) view that religious adherence mitigates exposure to higher risk-taking on one hand, but also supports the Abedifar et al. (2013) findings that clients' religious beliefs drive risktaking activities.
For the strong board analysis, our primary results show that stronger regular bank boards are associated with more risk taking also in Islamic banks, in the same way as in conventional banks (e.g. Pathan, 2009 ). Higher levels of board independence in isolation also stimulates risk-taking.
These results are consistent with prior conventional banking literature (Pathan, 2009 ) and corporate studies (Cheng, 2008) . Taken together we can conclude that variations in board strength does not help IBs to mitigate risk-taking. Thus, we found nothing new here from IBs governance behaviour.
In the same vein, our Shari'ah governance analysis suggests that the larger the Shari'ah board size (SSB), the higher was the IB risk-taking. The most interesting results, though, are found when the Shari'ah board (LnSSB) interacts with strong board (small board size and high independence). This interaction variable (LnSSB*Strong Board) is positively (significant) related to both insolvency and funding risk proxies, but is negatively related to credit risk proxy. So the interaction between a SSB and strong board seems to help mitigate IB risk-taking. Taken together, we argue that given a risk averse environment due to Shari'ah safeguard and religiosity, the interaction between these boards may cause IBs to be risk averse rather than risk-takers.
Thus, both religiosity and Shari'ah supervision appear the key elements in Islamic bank risk-taking.
Religiosity safeguards the external environment on one hand and Shari'ah supervision makes the board behave more risk-averse.
Conclusion:
This The general problems of poor bank disclosure on governance and other matters has certainly limited this research, but suggests that future researchers should benefit from the trend toward standardizing reporting regimes. The need for banks to raise additional regulatory capital may also force more of them to seek stock exchange listings, and thus offer greater prospects to use marketbased risk measures. The greater number of IBs across the world, and the increasing professionalism of their staff, should also benefit future researchers in respect to larger samples and better information. Other approaches, such as the use of propensity score matching (PSM), might also be used to help identify differences between conventional and IBs. Finally, a separate study only on IBs to examine the endogenous relationship between Shari'ah governance and board governance could result in a useful future paper.
Our findings have several implications for CBs, IBs and bank regulators. CBs could learn some lessons from their Islamic pairs (IBs), and implement more controlling mechanisms in disciplining their boards, and hopefully motivate their board members to be driven more by values and ethics.
The recent creation of a banking and financial oath for individuals to pledge that they will follow a set of ethical principles in their day to day activities suggests that at least some conventional bankers have sought to address that problem. 16 Islamic bank boards should also note the relationship between risk-taking with a strong board, and modify their own practices accordingly.
In particular, Islamic bank regulators should give more attention to development of wellfunctioning Shari'ah boards. Their interaction with the regular BoD, which will help enhance the religious goals of Islamic banking in practice. Further, regulators may wish to consider variations on these themes as a way to help restore the credibility of their overall banking system, and perhaps question whether a bank board with 24 directors (as does one of our sample) is an example of sound prudential regulation. 
Funding Risk
TANEQU
Tangible equity/total assets. As equity is a cushion against asset malfunction, this ratio measures the amount of protection afforded to the bank by the equity invested. The higher this figure, the more protection there is and hence, the lower funding risk. Karels and Prakash (1987) The risk-taking proxies used in the model are Log_Z, TANEQU and NPL. Islamic is the Islamic bank dummy. Strong Board is constructed as the board size smaller than median board size and Indep as high than the median of the sample. The bank characteristics in the model are Big4, RDI, EQTA, ROIAA, and Log_TA. Big4 is a dummy for the Big 4 audit firm. RDI is the risk disclosure index. EQTA is equity to total asset ratio. ROIAA is return on operating income by average assets. Log_TA is the log transformation of total assets. We also include CEO control variables in bank characteristics including CEO_Chair (a dummy for CEO duality) and CEO_Internal (a dummy for internally appointed CEO). The country characteristics include Log_GDP, Dinsur, Restrict, and Religion. Log_GDP is the log transformation of GDP. Dinsur is a score for the explicit deposit insurance from Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007 Levine ( ) (updated in 2008 using the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org) and Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Edward J. Kane, and Luc Laeven (2007) (http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm). Restrict is a score of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks. The regulatory restriction is from Barth et al. (2004) and Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007) using the data downloaded from the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org). Religion is a dummy for the major religion of the country as Islam. Listing is a dummy for listed banks. * is the country-year-fixed effects, and is the whitenoise error term. The models are estimated via the two-step GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . Standard errors are adjusted via the finite sample correction derived by Windemeijer (2005) , robust t statistics are reported in round brackets. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5, 10) percent level.
(1) Log_Z (2) The risk-taking proxies used in the model are Log_Z, TANEQU and NPL. The board characteristicscaptured by the CG vector are LnBoard and Indep. LnBoard is the log transformation of the number of board members. Indep is the ratio between the number independent directors and the total number of directors. LnSSB is the log transformation of SSB size. We also include CEO control variables in bank characteristics including CEO_Chair (a dummy for CEO duality) and CEO_Internal (a dummy for internally appointed CEO). The other bank characteristics in the model are Big4, RDI, EQTA, ROIAA, and Log_TA. Big4 is a dummy for the Big 4 audit firm. RDI is the risk disclosure index. EQTA is equity to total asset ratio. ROIAA is return on operating income by average assets. Log_TA is the log transformation of total assets. The country characteristics include Log_GDP, Dinsur, Restrict, and Religion. Log_GDP is the log transformation of GDP. Dinsur is a score for the explicit deposit insurance from Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007 Levine ( ) (updated in 2008 using the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org) and Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Edward J. Kane, and Luc Laeven (2007) (http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm).Restrict is a score of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks. The regulatory restriction is from Barth et al. (2004) and Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007) using the data downloaded from the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org).Religion is a dummy for the major religion of the country as Islam. Listing is a dummy for listed banks. * is the country-year-fixed effects, and is the white-noise error term. The models are estimated via the two-step GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . Standard errors are adjusted via the finite sample correction derived by Windemeijer (2005), robust t statistics are reported in round brackets. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5, 10) percent level.
(1) Log_Z 
